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1. Some history 
In order to understand what was involved in the cognitive revolution that 
took place around 1960 we must go back to the origins of psychology as an 
academic discipline in the late 19th century, and in particular to the various 
concepts of ‘mind’ that were current in that period. Let us first look at a con-
cept of mind typically found in the metaphysics of that period (and other pe-
riods as well). In the very popular handbook on metaphysics by Bowne, first 
published in 1882 but reprinted many times after that, we read: 
In spontaneous consciousness the mental subject is given as active and abiding; and 
the race has constructed various names for it, as mind, soul, spirit, and their equiva-
lents, to indicate its reality. The structure of all thought and language concerning the 
inner life also implies it. This general conviction of the race we believe to be correct. 
Nevertheless it is disputed on various grounds; and the soul is declared by many to 
be only a name for a group of states of consciousness, more or less complex, which 
are produced in some way or other, but which inhere in no substantial or active sub-
ject. […] The question concerning the reality of the soul is commonly called the 
question of materialism or spiritualism. […] The true question is whether the soul be 
a proper agent acting out of itself, or whether it is only a name for a set of states of 
consciousness produced and brought together from without, by physical organization 
or otherwise. The view which maintains the former position we call spiritualism. 
(Bowne 1926: 300) 
Bowne was professor of philosophy at Boston University. The man whose 
views he was opposing was William James, professor of psychology at 
nearby Harvard, who, in his epoch-making Principles of Psychology of 1890, 
defended an incipient materialist concept of mind. Harking back to predeces-
sors like Herbart, Hume and Mill, who had proposed theories of the mind 
where the mind was seen as a causally determined (though not yet unambi-
guously physical) mechanism, he proposes, not without a great deal of hesita-
tion, a cautious form of physicalism: 
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Bodily experiences, therefore, and more particularly brain-experiences, must take a 
place amongst those conditions of the mental life of which Psychology need take ac-
count. The spiritualist and the associationist must both be ‘cerebralists,’ to the ex-
tent at least of admitting that certain peculiarities in the way of working of their own 
favorite principles are explicable only by the fact that the brain laws are a codeter-
minant of the result. (James 1901: 4, italics original) 
We shall see that some seventy years later Harvard will again be the 
scene of controversy in psychological theory. 
But before we come to that we must review the momentous development 
of BEHAVIORISM in America. The year of its birth is usually given as 1913, 
when John Broadus Watson, professor of psychology at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity in Baltimore, published his famous article ‘Psychology as a behavior-
ist views it’. Watson, who specialized in animal psychology, concluded that 
empathy or introspection as a method for the discovery of psychological pro-
cesses and structures cannot work for animals, and that the only way of, so to 
speak, getting into the animal’s mind is to apply the method of the physical 
sciences. This view he then applied to human psychology as well. 
First he distinguished the observable DATA, which can only consist in the 
BEHAVIOR of living organisms. Not all forms of behavior, however, inform 
us about the mind, but only those that cannot be explained by direct physical 
causation as studied in physics. Bleeding after a cut, for example, is ex-
plained by direct physical causation, but angry shouting after an insult is not. 
Bleeding and similar physical effects, therefore, need not concern the psy-
chologist, but anger and similar effects will have to: they require the assump-
tion of an intervening mechanism. It is these indirectly caused forms of be-
havior that are the subject matter of psychology. A SPECIAL CAUSAL 
HYPOTHESIS is needed for their explanation. The hypothesis adopted by be-
haviorism consists in the assumption of a relatively simple stimulus transfer 
mechanism (‘conditioning’), much after the fashion of the theory of condi-
tioned reflexes developed since around 1900 by the Russian physiologist Ivan 
Petrovich Pavlov. It is this CONDITIONING HYPOTHESIS that characterizes 
behaviorism and was, by and large, abandoned around 1960. The other meth-
odological premises, namely the nature of the data and the causal questions 
asked, have continued to characterize the whole of cognitive psychology till 
the present day. It is only in the answers that modern psychology differs from 
behaviorism.  
Much more so than Jamesian psychology, behaviorism was thoroughly 
materialist. This, of course, fitted in perfectly well with the then powerful 
philosophical movement of positivism, which expressed a virtually unlimited 
faith in modern science as the salvation of mankind. People like the 19th cen-
HOW THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION PASSED LINGUISTICS BY 
 65
                                                
tury French writer and philosopher Hippolyte Taine had already promoted the 
belief that the humanities should adopt the methods of the natural sciences 
(see his book De l’intelligence of 1870, reprinted many times after)1.  
The period between 1920 and 1960 is characterized by a brash optimism 
with regard to the possibilities of the natural sciences, including the new 
mathematics and the new logic. Scientific ingenuity was seen as the one and 
only effective remedy for all social, political, economic and psychological 
problems that were so obviously besetting mankind all over the world. Now, 
of course, half a century later, we have become a little wiser and a great deal 
sadder. We realize that the problems are much deeper and more complex than 
what was thought then, and that present-day scientific understanding, 
whether in terms of natural or of human sciences, barely probes beyond the 
surface.  
One may well regard behaviorism as one of the most powerful expres-
sions of this general attitude of positivism. It meant a total rejection of the old 
spiritualist or idealist views of the mind. All so-called ‘mentalist’ talk was 
stigmatized as being unscientific. People had no emotions, desires, intentions 
or thoughts, only conditioned responses, based on stimulus associations that 
had taken place in their life histories. Behaviorism was, in actual fact, a psy-
chology without the mind.  
Nowadays we agree that the behaviorist dogma (because that is what it 
soon became) of conditioned responses was an extremely superficial theory, 
even though, from a purely methodological point of view, it was perhaps the 
right start. One begins with a minimal hypothesis as a possible explanation of 
the observed data, and enriches the initial simple theory only if forced by the 
facts. This is nothing but the principle of simplicity of scientific theories, or 
Ockham’s razor. And the theory of conditioned responses was indeed just 
about the rock bottom minimal theory for the data in question. But the theory 
became an ideology, a revolt against ‘mystic’ views of man and mankind, the 
embodiment of the new scientific approach to all human phenomena. For 
about forty years many psychologists, especially in America, were mentally 
unable to give it up, or even relativize it.  
Dogmatic behaviorism was widely applied. It was thought that any form 
of undesirable or ‘deviant’ behavior could be corrected by reconditioning 
those individuals who were guilty of it. In 1968 I heard the famous Harvard 
behaviorist Burrhus F. Skinner boast about his treatment of homosexuals, 
 
1 Ferdinand de Saussure was a personal friend of Taine’s during his Paris years, and was 
profoundly influenced by him (see Aarsleff 1982: 356–71).  
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who were given electrical shocks when viewing a projected picture of an at-
tractive naked man, but sweets when viewing a picture of an attractive naked 
woman. He did not mention the many suicides that resulted from this kind of 
‘therapy’. Many other examples can, of course, be mentioned.  
But not all manifestations of the general positivistic attitude were as sinis-
ter as the excesses of behaviorism. We also see, especially in Europe, a spate 
of high-spirited movements that tried to improve the world and mankind by 
the application of the new mathematical logic introduced by men like Frege 
and Russell. If only people could be taught to speak and think logically, the 
world would be a better place. In the Netherlands, for example, we had the 
progressive idealistic ‘Significa’ movement, founded in the early 20th century 
by the writer Frederik van Eeden (who was directly inspired by Victoria Lady 
Welby who led a similar movement in Britain) and the great mathematician 
Luitzen E. J. Brouwer (see Schmitz 1990). This movement affected all young 
mathematicians and logicians of the period in the Netherlands, and many oth-
ers as well, and it was not until well into the 1970s that it gradually faded 
away.  
Natural language, too, was suspect in the eyes of the positivists, as it was 
regarded as ambiguous, vague and logically unreliable. A fairly large number 
of artificial languages were developed in the hope that they would supplant 
the existing national and regional languages of the world. These artificial lan-
guages, not only Esperanto but also Volapük, Interlingua and many others, 
mostly developed by linguistic amateurs (some of them crackpots), were 
thought to be logically sound and semantically unambiguous. If only the 
world could be persuaded to adopt these languages as the only official means 
of communication, there would no longer be any wars or other forms of hu-
man misunderstanding. I clearly remember, from the days I went to school 
and to university, schoolmates and fellow students who came from progres-
sive, mostly socialist, families and carried with them the scientific and lin-
guistic ideals of those idealistic but naïve modernist movements.  
The linguistic professionals did not, on the whole, go for international ar-
tificial languages. Instead, they went for structuralism. Structuralism is the 
view that the object of enquiry can be studied as if it were some kind of ma-
chine, consisting of functional parts that make it work. In Europe, linguistic 
structuralism started in the late 19th century with the Polish linguist Jan Bau-
douin de Courtenay and, a little later, with Ferdinand de Saussure in Genève. 
Much has been written about the origins of European structuralism, but what 
is of direct interest to us in the present context is the fact that it did not, or not 
explicitly, adhere to a strictly materialist theory of the mind and even less to 
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behaviorism. As a consequence, introspection or empathy as a method for the 
testing of analyses was considered legitimate, and so were appeals to seman-
tic phenomena. The Europeans, in short, were much more traditional and 
much less modernistic as regards questions of the mind than their American 
colleagues.  
In America, linguistic structuralism turned behaviorist and thus material-
ist. The leading American structuralist linguist was Leonard Bloomfield 
(1887–1949), who had become a staunch supporter of behaviorism around 
1920. Through his teaching and his influence, but above all through his book 
Language of 1933, he dominated American linguistics from 1925 till his 
death in 1949 and foisted behaviorism on it. This meant that, at least until the 
cognitive revolution of 1960, semantic phenomena were regarded with dis-
trust and linguistic theories were set up without any appeal to semantic no-
tions. Outsiders did find this curious, and they were right, because a linguis-
tics without meaning can only be an abomination. But that is how it was for 
quite some time. (Even so, American structuralism has been extremely fruit-
ful and has led to real insights, but in hindsight we regard it rather as a mere 
passing rite than as a great breakthrough in and of itself.)  
 
2. The Cognitive Revolution 
Then, around 1960, the cognitive revolution happened, ushering in the 
new era of COGNITIVE SCIENCE, which continues up to the present day (see 
Gardner 1985 for a well-informed survey). The revolution happened in psy-
chology and amounted to a rejection of behaviorism and the introduction of 
the computational view of the mind.  
Just after World War II a few independent minds were beginning to real-
ize that the hypothesis of conditioned responses was basically insufficient for 
a rational explanation of the relevant behavioral data. The first to speak about 
this openly was Karl Lashley, who vented his doubts and arguments in a pa-
per read at the Hixon Symposium of 1948 (Lashley 1951). He emphasized 
the fact that repetitive behavior cannot be explained behavioristically, as 
every new instance is necessarily physically distinct from all preceding in-
stances. There must, therefore, be a mechanism of identification, which, 
however, is not provided by behaviorist theory.  
These ideas were soon picked up and further elaborated by a group of 
‘angry young psychologists’ at Harvard, working in the close vicinity of B. F. 
Skinner, the leading behaviorist in the world. The group included George A. 
Miller, Jerome S. Bruner, Roger Brown, but also, from 1951 till 1955, the 
young Noam Chomsky, who had been awarded a junior research fellowship 
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at Harvard and quickly became a prominent member of the group. They 
found that humans are capable of acquiring skills that far transgress the 
boundaries of what can possibly be learned through conditioning. The acqui-
sition of competence in a language is a case in point, but other forms of be-
havior prove the same. For example, the repeated catching of a rebouncing 
ball by a child requires very precise reactions to the trajectory of the ball, 
which is different each time the ball is caught. As a matter of principle condi-
tioning cannot produce that skill. Or take the behavior of civilians in a town 
where shooting is heard from rooftops. These people run away to seek shel-
ter, lie down behind whatever can serve as protection, etc. Clearly, such be-
havior cannot be explained by an appeal to previous experience. Rational 
thinking seems a better explanatory basis. Thus there grew a climate of 
strong resistance to the behaviorist dogma. 
The alternative theory that the angry young psychologists came up with 
was a direct result of recent developments in mathematics and computer sci-
ence, in particular the theory of algorithms, as developed during the 1920s by 
mathematicians like Emil Post. An algorithm is a computational structure al-
lowing for the formal derivation of output strings of symbols from given in-
put strings of symbols or from a start command, which may be either random 
or statistically weighted. Among those who were in the know it was clear, by 
the mid-1950s, that the notion of algorithm was absolutely central to com-
puter science. Computer programs and their machine implementations are 
instantiations of algorithms.  
When the mind is imagined to be a vast computer plant, driven by a large 
number of algorithmic programs producing all sorts of coded outputs that 
regulate bodily processes, including the production and comprehension of 
linguistic symbols, we have a powerful alternative to the abysmally poor and 
restricted mechanism postulated by behaviorism. Conditioned responses were 
replaced with computer programs. This not only meant an enormous increase 
in the power of psychological explanations, it also left room for specific hy-
potheses about possible innate patterns of computational ‘prewiring’. This 
would help explain the otherwise curious fact that some specific abilities, 
such as the competent use of language, are normally acquired quickly and 
according to what appears to be a fixed acquisition program.  
As has been said, behaviorism had permeated linguistics through Bloom-
field and his followers. But Skinner felt that he could do better. In 1957 he 
published his book Verbal Behavior, meant to be the bible of behaviorist lin-
guistics. Chomsky’s review of this book in Language of 1959 is generally 
considered to have been crucial in the sudden downfall of behaviorism, 
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though it was hardly original, as most of its central ideas had been taken from 
Lashley (1951), and in spite of the fact that it contained many crucial inade-
quacies, especially in the way Skinner’s ideas were misrepresented2.  
It so happened that the cognitive revolution, and in particular Chomsky’s 
attack on behaviorism, coincided with another revolution, this time in linguis-
tics, much less important but attracting a great deal more publicity. The lin-
guistic revolution was likewise based on the notion of algorithm. Zellig S. 
Harris (1909–1992), a close follower of Bloomfield and a keen reader of 
mathematics, was familiar with algorithmic notions, and at the end of his 
magnum opus (1951) he actually proposes, though still in rather clumsy ter-
minology, an algorithmic structure for natural language grammars (see 
Seuren 1998: 213–215). That is, a grammar of a language L was considered 
to be an algorithm, driven by a random start command and specifying in a 
formally exact way what sequences of what constituents will generate pre-
cisely the set of proper, grammatical sentences of L. This, of course, was the 
origin of what we have come to know as GENERATIVE GRAMMAR. In his fa-
mous (1957) and later writings, Noam Chomsky developed this notion fur-
ther, and managed to take all the credit.  
 
3. The Unsatisfactory Sequel 
One would naturally expect the two revolutions, the cognitive and the 
linguistic, to merge, since the algorithms postulated by linguists for the gram-
mars of natural languages would naturally be regarded as instances of the 
kind of mental algorithms envisaged by psychologists. It was inevitable that 
the question of the psychological reality of grammatical algorithms should be 
raised. And so it was, but it was never answered satisfactorily. The new 
school of generative grammar never stopped being half-hearted, ambiguous 
and noncommittal regarding questions of psychological reality. While the 
cognitive revolution brought the mind back into psychology, the linguistic 
revolution saw the mind but left it at the doorstep. Why and how this hap-
pened is the question that occupies us in the present paper. 
The question is especially interesting because during the 1960s a new de-
velopment in generative grammar, under the name of GENERATIVE 
SEMANTICS, made serious and highly promising advances in the direction of 
cognitive science. Generative Semantics, which had been initiated by some of 
 
2 See in particular MacCorquodale (1970). Murray (1994: 232) speaks of a “blatant misrep-
resentation”.  
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Chomsky’s followers, notably John Ross, Jim McCawley, Paul Postal and 
George Lakoff, rejected the random generator view of grammar and saw the 
grammar of a language as a formal, algorithmic transducing device turning 
thoughts into sentences and vice versa. Such a view is obviously more natu-
ral, and more cognitivist, than the random generator concept, which hardly 
stands a chance of being psychologically real. But it involves the notion of 
(propositional) thought and requires a good knowledge of logic, semantics 
and a fair amount of philosophy. And that was, apparently, too much for 
Chomsky and his followers, who mounted a violent campaign against Gen-
erative Semantics in the early 1970s and caused its virtual disappearance 
from the linguistics market place.  
The role played by Chomsky, in this respect, deserves special scrutiny. It 
is remarkable, to say the least, that the man who was so prominently instru-
mental in demolishing behaviorism and who subsequently became the most 
influential figure in linguistics shirked from drawing the consequences of his 
anti-behaviorism and continued to be distrustful of all things mental, as if be-
haviorism had never ceased to exist. Chomsky never developed a feel for or 
interest in semantics. His theory of grammar, in the various guises it assumed 
over the years, has not so far managed to establish an organic link with a 
proper theory of meaning. Nor has it ever changed its representation of 
grammar as a random sentence generator. The notion of a grammar as a for-
mal mediating device between thoughts and sentences was steadfastly re-
jected, although that is the notion one expects if the mental, cognitive char-
acter of grammar is taken seriously. Moreover, Chomsky’s ideas regarding 
the question of the psychological plausibility of such a randomly generating 
grammatical model never reached any degree of clarity or precision but kept 
vacillating in inconsistent ways (see Botha 1989: 159–164 for a trenchant 
discussion).  
During the 1970s and later, he used his full weight to attack and demolish 
the burgeoning development of Generative Semantics. One would expect him 
to support this new development with great enthusiasm, as it was a direct 
continuation of the cognitive revolution which he himself had helped initiate. 
But he did the opposite and used all means in his power to crush that devel-
opment. In doing so he relied on heavy rhetoric and power politics but never 
on academic argument3. One naturally wonders why. Many feel inclined to 
 
3 See R. Harris (1993), Huck & Goldsmith (1995) or Seuren (1998: 493–527) for thorough 
discussions and analyses of this shameful episode in the history of linguistics. Newmeyer 
(1980) is factually unreliable and shows a strong pro-Chomskyan bias, as shown in McCaw-
ley (1980).  
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seek the answer in his character and his personal ambitions and idiosyncra-
sies. The new theory of Generative Semantics had not been initiated by him 
but by some of his followers. Had he gone along with them, he would have 
lost the initiative and would have had to play second fiddle to them. Other, 
even more dubious, motives have been suggested, but we shall refrain from 
any speculations in that regard.  
It is clear anyway that Chomsky’s towering position in the field made 
enough of an impression on large numbers of mediocre young linguists for 
them to follow the Master uncritically and reject Generative Semantics 
merely on the strength of his authority. But Chomsky’s excessively dominant 
position still does not explain why so many other, more clear-minded lin-
guists, who could have shown some independence, were so quick at uncriti-
cally rejecting a development that was conquering the world even more rap-
idly than the random generator model had done a decade earlier and whose 
research program was unusually clear and promising.  
When tackling this question it is perhaps best to see it in a wider perspec-
tive. Why did the cognitive revolution not sweep the world as behaviorism 
had done? Cognitive science replaced behaviorism, but its effects remained 
largely limited to psychology and its applications, especially artificial intelli-
gence and natural language processing. And its influence was also felt in cer-
tain sections of the philosophy of mind, where mental modeling and the mind 
as a human phenomenon were taken more seriously. Outside these areas, 
however, the situation did not change much, even though it became unfash-
ionable to mention behaviorism overtly. Cognitive science had brought the 
mind back into psychology, but it was, apparently, not strong enough to re-
move the widespread feelings of awe and fear with regard to the mysteries of 
things mental in the world at large.  
One factor may have played a role in this respect. Although the computer 
metaphor turned out to work well for an analysis of many specific areas of 
mental activity, certain central facts about the human mind remained unex-
plained in this new approach, and have remained so till the present day. One 
thinks in particular of human decision making processes, i.e. the action of 
free will, and of the difference between mental phenomena that are open to 
awareness or consciousness and those that take place ‘underground’ as fast 
and automatic routines and are screened off from introspection. In general, 
consciousness phenomena have remained unexplained. They seem to require 
a conscious inner subject of the processes at hand, a ‘homunculus’ living in-
side the mind or brain, reading off the interfaces and taking the decisions. But 
that ‘homunculus’ must again have a mind with a second order homunculus, 
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and so forth ad infinitum. Problems of this nature have been discussed in the 
literature of the philosophy of mind, but they have not been solved in cogni-
tive science. In fact, they are hardly ever discussed there. It is quite possible 
that this striking inadequacy is one of the causes of the widespread lingering 
hesitation with regard to a scientific treatment of mental phenomena.  
Another factor may have been the lack of support from the new discipline 
of FORMAL or MODEL-THEORETIC SEMANTICS that came about after 1970. 
During the ’60s the young Californian logician Richard Montague began in-
vestigating the possibility of considering natural language, or more precisely 
English, as some sort of formal logical language. His idea was that English, 
and probably other languages as well, offered a challenge to the logician in 
that it would be interesting to see to what extent it could be treated as a well-
defined formal language of the sort developed by logicians. It so happened 
that at that time there was a new trend in logical proof theory, the so-called 
‘semantic movement’, which aimed at facilitating logical proofs with the help 
of ‘models’ with respect to which the logical formulae are true or false. Mon-
tague applied this logical (but hardly linguistic) notion of ‘semantics’ to natu-
ral language, to find out how far he could carry it through. As has been said, 
the development that resulted, after 1970, is called ‘formal’ or ‘model-
theoretic’ semantics. 
This form of semantics has no linguistic roots. It is directly derived from 
modern mathematical logic, which, one should realize, had been explicitly 
anti-psychological since Bertrand Russell’s book The Principles of Mathe-
matics of 1903. Since then till the present day, logicians have generally taken 
it for granted that logic has nothing to do with correct thinking but is, instead, 
a formal calculus for ‘entailments’, i.e. necessary consequences of the kind 
mathematicians work with.  
Yet it was this explicitly noncognitive form of model-theoretic semantics 
that became established as the standard theory of meaning in linguistics, the 
reason being simply that linguistics had nothing better to offer, after all those 
semantically barren years of behaviorism. Many linguists, from all quarters, 
felt profoundly uncomfortable with the new formal semantics. Those who 
were engaged in studies of lexical meaning were especially unhappy, but they 
were not part of mainstream linguistics. And those linguists who were or 
thought they were at center stage, were forced by the circumstances to seek 
ways of bridging the gap and come to an arrangement. The Chomskyan gen-
erativists have always felt uncomfortable in this respect. Others sought refuge 
in a different framework of grammatical theory, in particular CATEGORIAL 
GRAMMAR or HEAD-DRIVEN PHRASE STRUCTURE GRAMMAR (HPSG). This 
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is not the place to evaluate the merits of these and similar theories, which of-
ten show great intellectual acumen combined with formal prowess. The point 
here is, rather, that the semantics they incorporate is of the mathematical, 
model-theoretic, and thus noncognitive type.  
Meanwhile, model-theoretic semantics has started to make attempts at 
becoming more cognitively realistic. Since the early 1980s formal semanti-
cists have been working on formal systems that aim at taking into account the 
fact that uttered sentences are, as a rule, interpreted in terms of a given con-
text or discourse. But although these discourse-dependent systems of seman-
tic analysis and representation often show considerable technical proficiency, 
it is painfully obvious that their designers are neither linguists nor psycholo-
gists, nor indeed philosophers.  
Linguistics and formal semantics have thus remained strange bedfellows. 
This is regrettable because a more cognitively oriented theory of meaning 
might well have enabled linguistics to integrate better with the new cognitive 
science. But the opposite happened. The combined prestige of the new theo-
ries of grammar and the new model-theoretic semantics drove linguistics 
away from cognitive science.  
One might have expected that the 1970s development of Generative Se-
mantics, mentioned above, could or should have stepped in and offered a 
cognitively serious theory of meaning. But this did not happen, mainly be-
cause the group of young generative semanticists simply lacked the necessary 
training in philosophy and logic even to make a beginning with a proper cog-
nitive theory of meaning. And by the time they, or some of them, reached the 
stage of expertise and maturity where they could do something about this in a 
serious and professional way, it was too late, as the semantic gap had in ac-
tual fact been filled by model-theoretic semantics.  
Some linguists, however, did deplore the lack of cognitivism in linguis-
tics. During the 1980s the Californian linguist Ronald Langacker and some 
associates started a new movement in theoretical grammar called COGNITIVE 
GRAMMAR (Langacker 1987, 1991), closely related with CONSTRUCTION 
GRAMMAR (e.g. Croft 2001). Their aim is to bring language and cognition 
together again. But in trying to do so they take the a priori position that lan-
guage is not or hardly ‘modular’, i.e. there are no specific psychological 
functions for the acquisition and use of language, which are both taken to be 
fully explained by general human cognitive functions and communicative 
strategies. In other words, there is nothing specifically innate or ‘prewired’ 
about language. This new school of thought has meanwhile attracted a fair 
number of followers. Unfortunately, however, it is characterized by an ex-
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treme naiveté regarding the logical and philosophical foundations of seman-
tics and even more so regarding questions of cognitive modeling. Their psy-
chology has not proceeded beyond the simplest possible kind of pre-
Wundtian folk-psychology. They also appear to be totally unaware of well-
known and basically important philosophical questions of truth and meaning, 
to say nothing of their lack of familiarity with logic and its foundations. This, 
of course, hardly puts them in a position to achieve the badly needed integra-
tion of linguistics with cognitive science, which requires a judicious synthesis 
and rethinking of results and insights current in the disciplines concerned. 
 
4. The main cause and a possible solution  
Here we come to what is perhaps the main cause of the limited effect of 
the cognitive revolution: the magnitude of the enterprise and the lack of ex-
pertise of those who should be in a position to bring about a fruitful integra-
tion. Not that the current or dominant views in the disciplines concerned are 
all sound and only need to be tossed together to produce a satisfactory inte-
grated doctrinal salad. On the contrary, most ideas current in these disciplines 
are probably misguided, incomplete, uninformed and parochial. But it is 
mandatory that those who feel called upon to bring about the necessary cor-
rections should themselves have intimate knowledge of what goes on in the 
separate disciplines, so that their corrections are serious and professional.  
This has so far not or hardly been the case. The linguists, whether they 
are of the Chomskyan or any other denomination, are too often badly in-
formed about cognitive science, philosophy and logic. The pragmatists tend 
to know too little about philosophy, logic and sound methodology. The phi-
losophers of language hardly know any linguistics or psychology, and their 
knowledge of logic is, on the whole, superficial. Many of them, moreover, 
are only part-time philosophers of language, as they devote equal amounts of 
time to social philosophy, ethics, philosophy of law, philosophy of science, 
etc. The logical semanticists are, on the whole, strangers in linguistics and 
psychology, and mostly also in philosophy. And among all of those men-
tioned there are many who feel free to dabble in evolution theory, genetics 
and the prehistory of mankind.  
It is appropriate, in this context, to quote Karl Bühler, who saw this diffi-
culty coming, at least as far as linguists and psychologists were concerned. In 
1934 he wrote: 
Wenn die immer wieder geforderte gegenseitige wissenschaftliche Handreichung 
zwischen Psychologie und Linguistik Früchte zeitigen soll, so müssen die Fachmän-
ner auf beiden Seiten den Mut aufbringen, jeder dem anderen ins Konzept zu spre-
HOW THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION PASSED LINGUISTICS BY 
 75
chen. Keiner vermag sich selbst dem Gesetz von der beschränkten menschlichen 
Fassungskraft zu entziehen. (Bühler 1934: 111) 
For a serious and up-to-date reintroduction of the cognitive factor in the 
human sciences it is necessary, first, that a group of psychologists, linguists, 
pragmatists, logicians, philosophers, and possibly also geneticists, anthro-
pologists and prehistorians come together and commit themselves to the 
study of the FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE AND COGNITION. They will have 
to make themselves familiar with each other’s methods, results, ways of 
thinking, techniques and terminology. But that is merely a necessary condi-
tion. What is needed is also uncluttered, original thinking and communal 
brainstorming regarding the foundations of language and cognition. Only 
then can the problems be isolated in a fully professional and up-to-date fash-
ion and can a consistent set of new perspectives and theories be developed.  
If ever there was a need for interdisciplinary action it is now, in these 
fields. Some well-meaning linguistics departments start at the bottom end, 
treating their students to courses not only in the traditional linguistic subdis-
ciplines of phonology, phonetics, morphology, syntax, sociolinguistics, etc. 
but also in foreign language teaching, semantics and sometimes even in natu-
ral language processing (but usually very little cognitive science, logic or 
philosophy). How useful such curricula are is hard to say. They certainly 
carry the risk of creating an unintegrated hodge-podge in the heads of the stu-
dents, who are taught by staff that are themselves insufficiently informed 
about the other subjects taught to the same students. On the whole, it does not 
seem realistic to expect that a process of productive integration of the various 
results, insights and research traditions will get off the ground in this way.  
The action should start at the very top, and as a group effort. The re-
quirements are too heavy to be met by single individuals. The action should 
take the form of a research institute with places for postdocs and PhD stu-
dents. If the results obtained are valuable, they will automatically trickle 
down into undergraduate teaching. What is needed is a think tank of original 
and open-minded specialists who are forced to interact intensively and on a 
daily basis, and whose publications will carry the necessary weight. I have 
some experience with institutes of the German Max Planck Gesellschaft. 
These come close to the ideal just sketched. Yet as institutes they tend to be 
too large for the purpose at hand, which requires a new initiative, based on a 
stricter formula of interaction. But who will have the capacity and the will to 
set such a thing into motion? This is a question I have no answer to. 
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